Author. 



^it*o^ 




Title 






Imprint 



MAJOR GENERAL PHILIP SCHUYLER, 



AND THE 



BITRGOYNE CAMPAIGN IN THE SUMMER OF 1777. 



" No heatl more gentle ever bowed nVr toil; 

No neck more yieldiiii"- bent to duty's yoke. 

No lure could tempt him, no sednctidn soil, 

Because his heart went with the word he spoke. 

And God still <rnided him on manhood's way ! 

Well said, wise Shaiiespeare — ' to thyself be true ; 

And it shall follow, as the night the day. 

Thou can'st not then be false to any man ! ' 

And thns in oneness with his nature's plan. 

He wrought whate'er his hand might tind to do — 

With ail his strength, his heart, his mind, his will ! 

God rest him ! may his sweet kxample still 

Stir, like the air of Liberty, which waves 

Our stari-y tings, and woos our soldiers' graves ! " 



Mr. President ano Members of the New York Historical 
Society : — At the annual meetings in Jannarv, 1875, and in 1870, 
I exerted myself to portray to yon tlie greatest patriot, citizen and 
soldier developed by tlie " Slaveholders' Rebellion," for the sal- 
vation of the national integrity. The paper for this evening will 
be an equally earnest endeavor to present to you the character of 
the purest patriot, the most self-sacrificing citizen, and by far the 
ablest military commander belonging to the State of New York, 
who was brought to tlie front by the American Revolution — the 
seven years' war — to usher into being and establisli that which 
George II. Thomas did so mucli to preserve. 

Tlie great man now to be considered, was by birtli and descent 
a real son of tlie Empii« State, aiid_his prescient sagacity dis- 
(•erned the vovy system whi(!h gave it pre-eminence. He was a 



true Ivnickerl)ocker in tlie fullest sense of the word, bred and 
trained on its battle-fields which constituted tiiis colony, as it has 
been appropriately styled, the "Cock-pit of America." Yes, New 
York was to the Tliirteen Colonies, that which Belgium or 
Flanders or the old Netherlands had and has ])e':n for centuries 
iji Europe, the l)attle-iield between France and England. During 
our embryo condition, New York was to France and England 
exactly what Sicily became in tiie prophetic language of Pyrrhus, 
for Rome and for Cartliajire, the train in<j;-s:round for British and 
Frencli soldiers and generals, their regulars, provincials, and 
Colonial militia. 

In a similar school to that of Schuyler, and among many of the 
princii)al actors on the fields of 1776 and 1777, Washington pre- 
pared himself for his extraordinary station, and with sucli ex- 
perience, Sclmylcr made liimself tlie eminently useful man lie 
turned out to be — sufficiently pi-actical to ruin so renowned a 
professional as Burgoyne, to whom all the world imputed genius. 

He was tlie second Major General nominated l)y the Colonial 
Congress, second onl}' in graiJe to AYashington, and second to no 
man in tlie virtues • which constitute one of nature's nobility — 
second in nothing that is re<piisite to complete and make up the 
Christian gentleman. 

To wliom, of all our continental major generals, excepting 
Washington, would such language as this be applicable unless 
to Major General Philip Schuyler. 

To those present, who may not be intimately ac(juainted with 
tlie histoi-y of tlie American llevolution, sucli language may ap- 
])ear like exaggeration. No one will esteem it so when he hears 
tlie following attest from the pen of <me of our most truthful, 
judicious, learned and reliabh^ men — the venerable Chancellor 
James Kent: 

"Among the ])atriots of the American Bevdliitioii who as- 
serted the rights of their country in council, and equally 
vindicated its cause in the field, the name of Philip Schuyler 
stands pre-eminent, in acuteness of intellect, profound thought, 
indefatiga]>le activity, exhaustless energy, pure patriotism, and 
])ersevering and intrepid public efforts, he had no superior." 

Again, this distinguished man remarked in a discourse before 
this vei-y Society in 1S28: "If the military life of General 
Schuyler was inferior in brilliancy to that of some others of his 
countrymen, none of them ever surpassed him in fidelity, activity, 
an<l devotedness to tlie service. The characteristic of all his 



measures was utility. They bore the stamp and unerring pre- 
cision of practical science. There was nothing complicated in 
liis character. It was cliaste and severe simplicity ; and, take 
him for all in all, he was one of the wisest and most efficient men, 
both in military and civil life, that the State or the Nation has 
produced." 

To do justice to tliis theme and to present a proper biograph- 
ical sketcli of this great and good man would far exceed the 
lindted portion of time which can be allotted to any one at this 
Annual Meeting. Consequently it is advisable, if not absolutely 
necessary to confine the attention to that period of his career 
which, althougli often written, has never been presented so clearly 
in a condensed form as it should have been to enable his fellow 
citizens generally to know how much he did accomplish — hew 
much he deserved — how, when success was about to crown his 
efforts, his laurels were partly filched from him by a vain-glorious, 
but cunnino; intriguer not "native here and to the manner born" — 
partly wrenched from him by a body of politicians, like all asso- 
(jiations of political parties incapable of understanding a frank 
and loyal soldier, and of comprehending a disinterested self-sacri- 
ficing man. This intriguer, Horatio Gates, was perfectly under- 
stood by the true men of the day, and by his clearer headed 
associates in arms. They saw through the boasting Englishman, 
who so unblushingly appropriated, and who wore so arrogantly 
the laurels which belonged to the son of New York. 

How significant the words of his friend, Charles Lee, when 
inflated with his ])revious good luck, Gates set off to assume the 
(tonnnand in the Carolinas, conferred upon him b}' Congress, 
without consulting Washington. " Beware," said Lee, " that 
your northern laurels do not change to southern willows." 

It did not require either much time or opportunity to reveal 
Gates. He showed himself at his full value at Camden, wlien 
there was no self -forgetting Schuyler to prepare for him the way, 
and secure to him the victory. 

From the battle-field to which lie hastened without a general's 
preparation, lie was swept away amidst the first rout. Well 
inight censure fall "very heavily on General Gates for the 
precipitation and distance of liis retreat." His first stop was at 
Charlotte, ninety miles from the scene of action, and "he scarcely 
halted (or drew rein) until he reached Hillsborough," one hun- 
dred and eighty miles from Camden. It is said that " his hair 
grew wliite as lie flew" wildly away fr^mTTfie scene of disastrous 



defeat wliicli lie had counted upon ns the stage of assured triumph. 

From Hillsborough, he wrotu in the humblest style to Wash- 
ington, deprecating a severe judgment on the part of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and appealing to the generosity of the very man 
whom he had so wickedly labored to throw down and to supplant, 
Schuyler was almost avenged through tliis inglorious flight. In 
some resjjects this disgrace of Gates was in strict accordance with 
line drawn poetical justice, but nothing human could compensate 
Schuyler for the injuries Gates and his faction had done him both 
in 1776 and 1777. Schuyler had already more to forgive before 
tlie summer (campaign of '77, than most men are willing to con- 
done, and forbearance ceased to ])e a virtue when the incalculably 
over-estimated Englishman was called to take liis place, in August 
of this year 1777. 

AVliat feelings of self-condemnation must have passed through 
tlie mind of this wearer of another man's anadem, when he 
reHected^u])on how he had vainly striven to play the same pai't 
in respect to Washington, tliat he had succeeded in playing 
towards Schnyler ; and that his very success with regard to 
Schuyler had revealed tlie truth in regard to liimself, and thus 
the educated Present tears from tlie brow of Gates, the wreath of 
victory placed there by the ignorant Past, and restores it to its 
])roper position upon that noble head, the shrine of a sagacity 
whicli, in spite of every obstacle, made possihle the surrender of 
Burgoyne. 

This statement — all tliat is said liere to-night — conies with 
double forcrc and augmented emphasis from the lips of the' 
speaker — a descendant, on every side, of families, who, with 
(■(|ual, if not of greatei' influence in the colony, were the political 
opponents of Schuyler, through whose counsels all of them suf- 
fered, and at whose hands the sufferings of some of them were 
inflicted. Therefore, thus to exalt him, and thus to pronounce his 
eulogy, is a testimony of his deserving which should carry with it 
a weight of conviction wliicli miglit be withlield were these the" 
utterances of a (*onnection, an associate, a member of the same 
})arty, and (•onse<piently more or less a partisan. 

" JMiilij) Schuyler was a pure and devoted patriot, and although 
my enemy in his closing years," is the retiord of tlie noted Elka- 
iiali Watsini, wi'itten in J 792, " I freely accord my homage of 
admiration and gratitude." 

" In spite of personal difference and (;onflict of opinion, which 
produced coldness and alienation, the deep reverence of Mr. AVat- 
son for (4eneral Schuvler was never diminished." In his memoirs 



he refers to liiin ill the following language : "General Schuyler 
possessed the highest order of talents. * * «- * jj^ ^yj^s .^ 
profound mathematician, and held a powerful pen ; his industry 
was unexampled ; his business habits were accurate and system 
atic, acquired under the discipline of General Bradstreet, of the 
British army, who was a distinguished friend of his family. 
Having extensively travelled and mingled with the first circles of 
society, he was eminently refined in his sentiments and elegant in 
his address. 

"Had Providence blessed Philip Schuyler with the etpianimity 
of mind and self-control which distinguished Washington, he 
would have been his equal in all the elevated moral and military 
attributes of his character. ' America owed to S(;huyler a vast 
debt of gratitude for his distinguished services, both in the 
Cabinet and in the Field. * * * 

"To the consummate strategic skill, and the wise Fabian pol- 
icy of Schuyler, we were indebted for the conquest of I^urgoyne. 
At the moment in which he was about to reap tlie fruits of liis 
sacrifices and labors he was superseded. When the laurels he had 
so M'ell earned were almost within his grasp they were cruelly 
wrested from him. He was sacrificed by a spirit of intrigue and 
insubordination in his army, cherished probably by the mutual 
anim<jsity which existed between him and the men of New Eng- 
land. The idea generally prevailed in those states that Schuyler 
fostered a hereditary prejudice against them, while tlie stern and 
arbitrary measures which at times marked his military career, and 
had probably been imbibed in the discipline of tlie British 
army, did violence to their sentiments of e(|uality and inde- 
pendence." 

If the anecdote which Mr. Watson relates to demonstrate tlie 
idea of discipline among the New England troops with whom he 
came in contact, was generally, and still prevalent in 1777, there 
is little wonder tliat such as tliese and a real soldier couhl not 
agree. The narrator having been born within rifle shot of the 
'•Blarney Stone of New^ England," Plymouth's "consecrated 
rock," he can scarcely be charged with prejudice against his 
brethren. "While passing through the camp" (at Cambridge), 
says he, " I overheard a dialogue between a captain of the militia 
and one of his privates, whicli forcibly illustrated the character 
and condition of this army. 'Bill,' said the ca])tain, 'go and 
bring a pail of water for the mess.' ' I shan't," was tlie reply of 
Bill ; ' it (i< ijoiir tani fww, Captain^ I got the last,' " 



6 

" Even the elements of subordination had then scarcely been 
introduced. Otticers and men had rushed to the field, under the 
ardent impulses of a common patriotism ; and the selections of 
the former by the troops or their "appointments, which first oc- 
curred, were rather accidental and temporary, tlian controlled 
from any regard to superior position or acquirement. All to a 
great extent had occupied at home, a social equality, tlie influenci' 
of wliich still remained. The distinctions of rank, and tlic 
restraints of military discipline and etiquette, were yet to be 
established." 

Philip Schuyler was an honest man, an open, able, gallant 
foe ; he did his full duty by the cause he espoused, and lie never 
received the acknowledgments due fo him, much less the reward 
to wliich he was entitled. As in the case of George H. Thomas, 
lie was dead before his countrymen had learned to know and a[)- 
preciate him. 

Why 2 Because both tliese illustrious Americans were too grand 
and too great for the measuring capacity of little, of ordinary 
men. The masses could not understand either Thomas or Schuy- 
ler, not only from sheer inability, but because they were perver- 
ted and misled by parties interested in underrating them. It 
requires a very man — not " bread and butter '' men — to compre- 
hend the truth, capacity, generosity, and magnanimity of sucli 
exceptional specimens of humanity as Tlioinas and Schuyler. 

Creasy, in his "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," one 
of the best known and one of the most liiglily esteemed works in 
our language in this generation, considers the "Surrender of Bur- 
goyne " as the thirteenth of tliose fields of decision — " tliose few 
battles, whose contrary event would have essentially varied tlic 
drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes."" This is un- 
douV)tedly the case. It was tlie greatest event of the American 
Revolution. It was the turning point — tlie " (4ettysl)urg" of tlie 
seven years' terrible struggle. 

There were no foreign arms present to share the glory. It 
was purely an American triumph. No Frenchman fixed a bay- 
onet or fired a shot. The Colonists did the work for tliemselves. 
No French sinews of war assisted ; no French ammunition was in 
the barrels of the victorious guns, or in tlie cartridge boxes of the 
victors. No foreign talent, so greatly overestimated in popular 
histories, directed, nor foreign gallantry led the men. Our peo- 
ple themselves won this success in the field, and it, in turn, won 
for them and for us the French alliance and co-operation. Had 



we been defeated at Bcelmms Heights, or Stillwater, or Free- 
man's Farm, or Saratoga, wliicliever be tlie title selected for the 
final collision, France wonld not have considered the Colonies as 
an available weapon — a clnb wherewith to avenge her wrongs 
upon England. Everything accorded to us, and done by Louis 
XYI. was subsequent. It was the .key to the sympathies of his 
cabinet. Without it there would have been no American inde- 
])endence. Nevertheless, the hero who made such a success pos- 
si))le, the real hero, the great man, Schuyler, appeared at the 
surrender as a simple citizen deprived of his command — in dark 
brown citizen's clothes, not in uniform — to see the arrogant little 
man. Gates, who supplanted him, enjoy the honors of the tri- 
umph and harvest its reward. 

But on this simple spectator in plain habiliments, the eyes of 
the defeated generals were lixed rather than upon the one in mil- 
itary costume, to whom they had to deliver u]) their side-ai-ms. 
If Burgoyne could not tender his sword to Schuyler in his modest 
citizen-suit, and if he could not surrender his army to him as to 
his noin'uKil conqueror, he nevertheless could still offer him his 
acknowledgements .is to his moral vanquisher — victor chiefest of 
all in magnanimity. 

The veiy spot selected for the Surrender of Burgoyne was " the 
ground where Schuyler's house stood, and Gates and his suite met 
the British generals and their staffs not far below the smouldering 
ruins of General Schuyler's mansion," and elegant improvements 
which the English general had caused to be burned, and, as he 
testifies, was theoidy property fired by the direction of himself or 
officers during the (campaign. Burgoyne even valued them at 
£10,000 stei-ling— ij^ri0,000 — e(jual to more than three times that 
amount at the present day. 

"One (jf the first persons 1 saw," said he, "after the convention 
was signed, was Gen. Schuyler. I expressed my regret at the 
event which had happened, and the reasons (military) which had 
< )ccasioned it. 

"You show me great kindness," added General Burgoyne, 
although I have done you nnich injury." 

" Think no more of it. Tliat was the fate of war;" replied 
the noble and brave New Yorker. 

Afterwards, in the presence of the assemWed British Senate, 
Burgoyne acknowledged his sense of gratitude for Schuyler's 
generous hospitality and chivalrous courtesy. 

Sucli high souk'd charity was indeecTextraordinary. 



The Baroness Riedesel, wife of the general eormiianding the 
German contingent, was affected ahnost to tears by Sclniyler's 
rec-eption. The kindness and tenderness of the " handsome," the 
" noble " man restored her courage and his hospitality the strength 
of lierself and her children. 

Now let lis turn from iScUuyler liimself to wliat he achieved. 

Pitt's plan of campaign for 1759, which resulted in tlic cap- 
ture of Quebec, and delivered the death-blow to Frencli dominion 
on this continent, was a masterpiece. It has been exceeded by 
very few mentioned in historj'^ ; and if each of Pitt's instruments 
had executed the duty assigned to him with only a portion of the 
ability and energy displayed by Wolfe, the whole bloody and 
costly business Mhich dragged on into anotlier year would have 
l)een terminated simultaneously witli the battle on the Plains of 
Abraham. 

Andierst, starting from his base in New York, was to cap- 
ture the Frencli forts on Lake Champlain, and to descend the 
river Kiclielieu to the St. Lawrence ; while Prideaux and Sir 
William Johnson were to drive the French out of their strong- 
liold of Niagara, and by Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence 
work on, down, to Montreal. Meanwhile, Wolfe, sailing from 
England, was to ascend the St. Lawrence, and to make himself 
master of the key-point Quebec. 

As is well known, Wolfe was the only one of tlic three who 
carried out his part of the programme, and fell in the arms of 
victory, deciding that England should be mistress not only of this 
their key, but of all the Canadas. 

In 1777, Pitt's plan of '59, for the con(piest of the Canadas, a 
masterpiece of strategical conception, was exactly reversed. Bur- 
goyne was to move southward, up Lake Champlain ; St. Leger, 
eastward, down the Mohawk, and Clinton northward, up the 
Hudson. The tliree were to concentrate at Albany, sever tlie 
middle and southern Colonies from New England, and then, from 
tiiis central position, dividing their strength, prevent nmtual as- 
sistance and crush both in succession. 

Von Bulow, the greatest military critic wlio has ever lived, 
tlie predecessor and superior of Jomini, was in this country 
shortly after the Revolution (1791-'2), and wrote upon tlie sub- 
ject in 1797, and in subsequent years. He gives the plan his 
uncpialified approl)ation. lie is thorougldy endorsed by a French 
military critic, Lieut. Colonel M. Jol}' de St. Valier, wlio pub- 
Ijslied lijs views more recejitlv in ISO;}. 



When he learned that General Burgoyne moved on Lake 
Champlain and occupied the post of Ticonderoga, he remarked : 
" I then thought the English had perceived tlieir mistake, and 
that their army was about to occupy the only post which was 
proper, and wlien I learned the arrival of Burgoyne at Ticondero- 
ga, I believed the Americans to be lost without remedy." 

But tlie short space of time allotted to this address compels 
tlie relinquishment of criticism and an immediate consideration 
of the facts of the summer campaign of 1777. 

On the 22nd May, General Schuyler was assigned to the 
command of the whole northern department. To tlie north, the 
extreme important point was Ticonderoga, 95 miles N. by E. of 
Albany; to the west, Fort Stanwix, on the site of the present 
city of Rome, 109 miles W. JS". W. of the State capital. He 
reached Albany from Philadelphia on the 3d June. Gates, with 
his usual indiscipline, refused to accept the subordinate (command 
of Ticonderoga. 

"General Schuyler found that 'nothing had been done during 
his absence, to improve the means of defense on the frontiers. 
Nothing, comparatively speaking, to supply Ticonderoga with 
provisions.' " He proceeded at once, with his usual " activity, 
fervor and energy," to procure supplies, rouse the committees of 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York to the importance of 
sending forward their militia, and was on his way to reinforce 
St. Clair witli about 2,000 men, wlien, on the 7th July, he re- 
ceived the intelligence that Ticonderoga was evacuated." 

Let us devote a few moments to the institution of a contrast 
between the army which had rendezvoused at Cumberland Point, 
on Lake Champlain, 17th — 20th June, and to which Ticonderoga 
had surrendered by day-break, on the 6th July, and which Schuyler 
now had to encounter, and this same after it had been depleted 
mord tlian one-half by battles, privations, desertions, labors and 
diseases within the next four months, when Gates appeared : like- 
wise between the force which Schuyler gathered up to arrest the 
victorious Burgoyne, and the gradually aggregated army which, 
when ready to crush the enemy, he was compelled tlirough envy, 
prejudice, enmity, and other baser passions, to turn over to Gates, 
nonvhiaUy to exercise command and actually to reap an unearned 
reward. 

NoTYihially is not an improper nor an unjust term, since even 
with his vast preponderance of numbers Gates would have 
accomplished little or nothing, had it not been for tlie superlative 



10 

intrepidity, intelligence, energy and ability of Arnold, for whom 
Schuyler had applied in the first instance, and tho experienced 
Morgan witli his unerring sharp-sliooters, themselves in influence 
and effect equal to a little army in this region, especially adapted 
to their service. 

When Burgoyne ascended Lake Ohamplain to " Old Ty," his 
fleet presented a splendid spectacle, and his army and flotilla were 
sup])lied with everything necessary to render them as effective for 
display as efticient for service. History sounds like romance in 
describing the magnificent spe(ttacle as it moved over this beauti- 
ful sheet of water, in the full brightness of oiu! of the cloudless 
summer days which rendei's ordinary scenes glorious witli its 
glowing golden sunlight. Besides all the regular appliances for 
the immediate campaign, no army of the period was ever more 
admirably equipped, and in proportion to its numbers and to 
their expected service, its train of artillery was complete. Out 
of its eight or nine thousand cond>atants, over seven thousand 
were either veterans or picked troops, umler leaders of great 
experience. Its commander-in-chief stood very high in his pro- 
fession, and he had nuide a brilliant roc<ird on the banks of the 
Tagus for dash, as well as judgment, under the eyes of a master in 
the art of war, thci famous Count S(;haumburg-Lippe, or Lippe- 
Buckeburg, who had been selectetl by Frederic, the Great, or the 
Second Frederic, Prince Ferdinand of T^runswick, to save the 
Kingdom of Portugal, on the very verge of ruin. 

Although Lake Ohamplain had witnessed many military pa 
geants in the previous French wars, it had never borne upon its 
bosom such a one as this. Disciplined war Avas here in all its 
perfectness of men, innterial and nmsic, and the "sea of moun- 
tains" which en(!irclc this inland sea, reverberated with the 
martial strains of England and of Germany. To these again 
responded the boat-songs, replete with melody, of the Canadian 
])rovincials ; the M'liole ac(;entuated by the wild l)attle cries of 
savage allies, decked in the highest l^irbaric ornament in which 
these revel on the war-path. 

Li opposition, Schuyler was not able for weeks to colle(;t over 
four thousand (yontinentals und ihilitia. The latter were not 
only destit\ite of proper weapons, l)ut of necessary equipments 
and of ade(juate clothing. There were not suflficient bayonets 
among them for one-third of the nniskets, and many of the 
j)atriotic frontiersmen who responded to the despairing (mw of the 
nation's birth-throes were so illy clad, that in the reports of the 



11 

day tliey were justly (|nalified as "naked." This, too, at a season 
of very unusual rain, in a region of forest and mai'sli-fog, where 
warm clothing is an absolute necessity for health at night, even 
in the dog days. 

When lluslied with victory and easy triumph, with the unre- 
sisted occupation of a fortress, esteemed by laymen a Gibraltar 
to close the route between Montreal and Albany, the British 
army concentrated at Skenesborough, and had been augmented 
by the accession of hundreds of royalists ; by this time Schuy- 
ler's motley force had dwindled to two thousand seven hundred; 
some reports state it as low as fifteen hundred dispirited men. 

Three months after, when Schuyler by practical-strategy, by 
constant attrition had reduced Burgoyne's effective strength to 
less than live thousand, the perseverhig New Yorker had gather- 
ed together twelve to fifteen thousand, with which Gates was to 
overwhelm the enemy at Saratoga. 

Even the New England historian, so bitter against those whom 
he does not endorse or affect, furnishes a paragraph whose admis- 
sions redeem nmch of his prejudiced chapters. It reads as fol- 
lows : " Burgoyne's campaign had i)roceeded as foreshadowed by 
Washington ; yet the anxious care of Congress concentred itself 
there. On the ffrst of August, it relieved Schuyler from com- 
mand by an almost unanimous vote, and on the fourth, eleven 
states elected Gates his successor. Before he assumed the com- 
mand, Fort Stanwix was safe and the victory of Bennington 
achieved; yet it hastened to vote him all the powers and all the 
aid which Schuyler in his moods of despondency had entreated. 
Touched by the ringing appeals of Washington, thousands of the 
men of Massachusetts, even from the counties of Middlesex and 
Essex, were in motion towards Saratoga. Congress, overriding 
Washington's advice, gave Schuyler's successor plenary power to 
make recpiisitions for additioiud numbers of militia on New York, 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania. AYushington had culled from 
his troops live hundred riflemen, and formed them under Morgan 
into the best corps of skirmishers that had ever been attached to 
any army ; Congress directed them to be sent iunnediately to 
assist Gates against the Indians, and Washington obeyed so 
promptly, that the order may seem to have been his own." 

Notwithstanding Gates had such a prepondei'ating force in 
hand, some 10 to 1^>,000 men, comparatively well organized and 
equipped, with as many more hastening forward to re-enforce him, 
he was evidently nervous at Stillwater aint^as unwilling to engage 



12 

as was charged upon Schuyler, when the latter had only 1,500 
troops, imperfectly armed and found, at Fort Edward. Nevertlie- 
less, all this time Gates was availing himself of Schuyler's plans 
without acknowledgment, while consulting Schuyler's friends and 
previous subordinates, so as to avoid the necessity of crediting any 
advice or assistance to its real suggestor and originator. More- 
over, if Arnold had not compelled him to fight, and had not 
fought, and had not thus precipitated events, a few days would 
have justified the remark of the French observer, viz : " That 
Burgoyne's troops would eventually have been obliged to beg 
Gates to accept their surrender, and accord them the means of 
prolonging life." Such was the condition of affairs for which 
Schuyler had prepared before the intriguing Gates arrived to 
profit by the desperate situation of the enemy. 

Schuyler, harassed and baffled, the British full and feasting ; 
Gates, or rather his troops, fought them fasting or starving, both 
as regards ammunition for their guns and supplies for their 
mouths. 

Schuyler received intelligence of the evacuation of a position 
impregnable in the opinion of the masses, either at his home at 
Saratoga, or on his way to Fort Edward. 

Could any experienced officer have believed that St. Clair 
would abandon a strong-hold like Ticonderoga, almost without 
tiring a shot ? Far be it from the speaker's intention to throw 
another stone at this unfortunate officer, but he was indeed, in 
every respect an unlucky man. John Adams, wlien lie lieard the 
news, was almost justified in saying, " We sliall never be able to 
defend a post until we shoot a general." This hard rule, but an 
effective one, would have produced admirable results if it had 
been applied in the Union army, during the *' Slave-holders 
Kebellion." 

Turenne, a master professor of the art of war, said that " in 
military matters the two most important factors were time and 
FORTUNE ; time was inestimable, but tliat adverse fortune was 
irresistible or invincible." St. Clair was no favorite of fortune, 
and his concluding scene, his crushing defeat by the Miamis, 
4th Nov., 1791, fourteen years afterwards, showed that he was 
not the man for emergencies. Ticonderoga ought to have 
arrested Burgoyne, at all events for a time. Still there was a 
silver lining to the black cloud of its abandonment. Had this 
fortress, which liad stopped more than one English and Frencli 
iirniy, arrested Burgoyne, his line of retreat thence was still 



13 

secure, whereas there was no chance of escape from Saratoga- 
Pretty much the whole blame of the loss of Ticonderoga fell 
upon the very man who had predicted the insuthciency of the 
garrison and its appointments, and had exhausted himself in vain 
appeals for the necessary reinforcements. Washington never 
blamed him, and subsequently he was fully exonerated by the 
government and by the people. 

Burgoyne next destroyed the American naval force upon Lake 
Champlain, and adv^anced to Skenesborough, now Whitehall, at 
the head of the lake. Thus far everything had been lovely with 
him ; all had been plain sailing. Here he began to encounter the 
obstacles prepared by Schuyler's engineering. 

One best posted in the details of American history, a jiarsh 
judge, a severe critic, merciless often, said that already at Skenes- 
borough, Burgoyne's plans had all been traversed by Schuyler's 
preparations, not of troops — these he could not obtain — but of 
engineering work which his mind could conceive as well as com- 
pel the execution. While at Skenesborough Burgoyne already 
saw defeat rise up like a spectre before him. He felt it. It can 
be discerned in his letters, in his utterances. 

This assertion, that, already at Skenesborough, Burgoyne felt 
some strong premonitions that he had lost his game, is almost 
admitted by implication by Stedman, and by Gordon, the most 
reliable writers on the Revolutionary War. On the 9th or 10th 
of July, the day following tlie affair at Fort Anne, General Schuy- 
ler played the same trick upon his opponent that Frederic the 
Great tried after Liegnitz, with even more success, seventeen years 
previously, on tlie 16tli August, 1760, on the Russian Chernicheff. 
By this means Frederic sent the Muscovites whirling in hot liaste 
back across the Oder, and Schuyler so perplexed Burgoyne, that 
the British general, victorious in four engagements, was in doubt 
whether to advance or to retreat. 

By so doing, our Knickerbocker leader proved that he was not 
deficient either in tlie stratagem which made Hannibal so famous, 
or in the strategy of Fahius, or in the practical-strategy of Ber- 
wick, so greatly praised by the noted military critic. Decker. 

Schuyler's every movement and action was consonant witli liis 
w^hole predetermined course of action. 

The day after Burgoyne cut loose from Lake Clianqjlain, he 
wrote to the Albany Committee '' sliould it l)e asked what line of 
conduct I mean to liold amid this variety of dithculties and dis- 
tress, I would answer, to dispute every inch of ground witli 



14 

General Biirgojne, and retard his descent into the country as long 
as possible." He kept his promise to the letter, and he S(j 
retarded General Burgoyne, that without counting sixteen days 
which the latter lost at Skenesborough, (some call it three weeks, but 
nnist include the delay at Fort Anne), it took him eight weeks 
more to overcome the distance, forty-one miles, which intervened 
between tluit place and B<emus Heights or Stillwater, the farthest 
point south to which he penetrated, about twenty -live miles north 
of Albany. 

The trick alluded to amounts to this : Schuyler took out 
from a canteen, which had a false bottom, a letter written in the 
interest of the Colonists to General Sullivan by one Mr. Levins, 
and su])stituted an answer intentionally worded so as to decei^'e 
and perplex Burgoyne, and leave him in doubt what course it was 
best for him to follow. Having communicated the contents to 
several gentlemen about him, he signed it " Canteen " and sent it 
forward by a messenger upon whom the idea was carefully im- 
pressed that he was to allow himself to be captured. The bearer 
was taken prisoner, and the communication confided to him soon 
came into Burgoyne's hands. This had all the effect which 
Schuyler could have desired. Burgoyne was so completely duped 
and puzzled l»y it for se\eral days that he was at a loss M'hether 
to advance or retreat. This acknowledgment, so llattering to 
our Knickerl)Ocker general's sagacity, was absolutely confessed 
to one of Schuyler's staff after the surrender, and this gentleman 
was asked whether he knew anything about the intercc[)ted letter, 
but no satisfaction was given to or obtained by the British com- 
mantler. 

Now, if a genej-al who has come four tliousand miles to invade, 
advance and tiglit, after an initiative of ten days, a conquest and 
two victories, is in doubt, already, whether to advance or retreat, 
this general is in a condition e(piivalent to feeling himself morally 
whipi)ed, and Burgoyne was already "Burgoyned" over a month 
l)efoi-e Gates even put in an appearaiu-e. At all events he knew 
it, surely, before Gates assumed command, for he had the news 
of Hoosick <»r Saucoick, misiuimed Bennington, on the 17th 
August. 

Neither time, opportunity nor intention permits any detailed 
consideration of the actual fighting or engagements which 
occurred. Nevertheless, it is utterly impossible to pass over 
without comment what are termed the battles of Hubbardton, on 
the 7th July, and Fort Anne, on the 8th. In both of these, as far 



ir> 

a,s moral effect wa^ eoncerned, tlie Americans were, to a large 
extent, successful , 

The Earl of Balcarras, who commanded the British light 
infantry, testitied before the Burgoyne Court of Inquiry, that 
" circumstanced as the enemy (that is, the Americans), was ; as an 
army very hard pi'essed in their retreat, they certainly behaved 
with great gallantry." He added, signiticantly, tliat "pursuit was 
not practicable.'" Bear in mind that the British force in this 
action was a picked brigade, under Burgoyne'.s best lieutenant, 
Frasor, whose death, subsequently, may almost be said to have 
terminated the British hard li2:htino;. 

The Earl of Harrington bore witness : " They (the Americans) 
behaved in the beginning of the action with a good deal of 
spirit, Ijut on the British troops rushing on them with their bayo- 
nets, they gave way in great confusion." He also added, " It 
certainly was not practicable to pursue the enemy further than 
they were pursued on that occasion. I think we ran some risk 
even in pursuing them so far." 

This language is the more remarkable and creditable to the 
Americans, because it could scarcely be expected for green troops, 
as a rule ivithotd hayo)tef.8, to stand tlieir ground against regulars 
well provided with this weapon of close combat and practiced in 
its use. Moreover, the cartridge boxes, as well as the stomachs 
of our people were empty ; in other words, tlieir muskets were 
no better than clubs in weak hands. Finally, at tlie critical 
moment, Cxeneral Riedesel arrived with his Brunswickers' sinaiiuij; 
their enthusiastic battle-songs, to flank the almost exhausted 
Americans, who were set down, even by the British, at not more 
than two thousand men. Fraser had at least eight hundred and 
fifty picked men, and Reidesel likewise brought up the ("I'lte of 
ills Germans. So mucli for Hubbardton. 

In regard to Fort Anne, Deputy Quartermaster-General 
Money says that the Americans' Are was heavier at Fort Anne 
than on any other occasion during the campaign, except in the 
action of the 19th September (known as the 1st Stillwater), that 
they continued a vigorous attack on a very strong position for 
upwards of two hours, and would have carried it had it not Ijeen 
for the Indians. 

Major Forbes testified that the Americans would have "forced" 
the British had it not been for the arrival of Indians, whose 
fearful " whoops " induced the Americans to believe that they 
were surrounded by savages. 



Lientetiant Colonel Hill, who coininanded the British 9th Reg- 
iment, liad iive hundred and forty-two veterans, and occupied a 
strong position. He certainly did not retain possession of the 
l»attle-iield, despite tlie arrival of tlie Indians, and the knowledge 
that Major General Phillips with the 20tli Kegiment, five hundred 
and twenty-eiglit men, and two pieces of artillery, was pressing 
forward to Ins assistance. 

It is somewhat curious, tliat, at Fort Anne, the English aban- 
doned a wounded officer of great inerit, likewise a surgeon and 
other prisoners, when, to use their language, they "changed 
ground." This scarcely reads like a victory. 

It is a great fashion to decry popular levies for not engaging 
regular troops when the latter are perfectly well armed, and the 
former most inadequately. As a rule (and a greatmany distinguislied 
generals have borne witness to the fact), young troops fight bet- 
ter tlian old troops on the aggressive wlien they are new to fire 
and its perils. 

During tlie Burgoyne campaign, charges have been reiterated 
against oui- men, of want of gallantry. It is only necessary to 
appeal to the enemy for their vindication. When the Earl of 
Balcarras was asked if the Americans abandoned their works on 
account of their fear of the British artillery, he answered, " The 
reason they did not defend their entrenchments was, that they 
always inivrched out of them, and attacked us.'' 

Let us now resume the direct consideration of Burgoyne's sit- 
uation, in order to discover why he lingered so long at Skenes- 
borough. His orders at that point are dated 7th until 23d July. 
On the 25th, he had only accomplished 12 to 13 miles and reached 
Fort Anne, where he remained until the 28th. On the 29th he 
was at Pitch-pine Plains, just south of it, and on the 30th, at 
Fort Edward, where he remained until the 13th August. In otlier 
words, he had only gained about twenty-five miles in advance in 
thirty-eight days. 

At Skenesl)orough he recognized that he had in front of him 
a comparative wilderness of about twenty-five miles, traversed by 
few wood-roads or tracks and bridle-paths. These M^ere almost 
impassible in such an exceptionally wet season as the summer of 
17T7, and moreover led through dense forests which Schuyler 
had converted into vast abatis. Hundreds of sturdy woodsmen, if 
t]u\v could not stand up in arms before regulars and shoot them 
down in line of 1>attle, could fell trees by tliousands. To quote tlie 
languaii:e of n <-ont(Mii])or:iry, "Schuyler converted these woods 



17 

into endless slashings, impenetrable with their interlaced branch- 
es." He likewise not only so completely obstructed the Wood- 
creek, wliicth flows by Fort Anne northward into Lake Champlain, 
by rolling- immense rocks into its channel, that he thereby ren- 
dered it extremely diflicnlt for Bnrgoyne to sn])ply the daily 
wants of his army, but he caused the very same to be done by the 
other Wood-creek, which empties into Oneida Lake and consti- 
tuted the cliannel of communication for the British troops 
operating before Fort Stanwix. St. Leger, in his report, states 
that it took one hundred and fifty woodsmen fourteen days to 
open the latter before he could get his batteaux up with supplies. 

The non-military listener may ask, what does all this amount 
to? Everything in war. That the commissariat is as important 
to an army as all the otlier administrative branches combined, is 
fully set forth in the military treatises of all ages. This military 
truth is to be found in the Old Testament, and logistics, especially 
in a new country, is more important than strategy and tactics. The 
employment of means rather than men, constitutes the pith of 
practical-strategy, and practical-strategy has saved more coun- 
tries than fighting. 

Frederic the Great was a practical commander if ever one 
existed, and he said that " to get a body of troops in condition 
for effective service, it was necessary to begin with the stomac^h,"" 
and added thereto, that "an army like a serpent goes on its belly." 

Schuyler impressed upon Burgoyne- the full force of this lesson 
from the very first, and he made the valley of the Hudson like 
Jordan, a hard road for the British to travel. It is conceded by 
every writer, that Burgoyne did not sometimes accomplish more 
than a mile in twenty-four hours, and, in exigencies, 'did not get 
over three to four miles a day. No wonder that an anonymous 
writer upon the Rcxolution exclaimed : " It was fortunate for 
Oeneral Gates that the retreat from Ticonderoga had been con- 
ducted under other auspices than his, and that he took the com- 
mand wdien the indefatigable, but unrecpiited labors of Schuyler, 
and tlie courage of Stark and his mountaineers had already 
insured the ultimate defeat of Burgoyne ! " 

Warren once made the remark that time in war was often so 
precious that delay at crises would be cheaply purchased at any 
expenditure of human life. At this time he was estimating the 
value of the morning hours gained on the first day of Gettysburg 
at such a tremendous cost of life, which, nevertheless, was clic;;; , 
inasmucli as it saved the position and enabled the army to concen- 
trate and estal)lisli itself. , 



18 

Otlier generals to whom this opinion was submitted considered 
it remarkjd)]_v sound. Apply this rule (»f judgment to Schuyler, 
and then, and only then, can the effect of his services he 
appreciated. The delay he imposed upon Burgoync was equiva- 
lent to more than one bloody victory. 

Marcellus, the " Sword of Rome," never gained an authenti- 
cated success over Hannibal, whereas Fabius, the •' Delayer " or 
" Shield," not only nearly ruined the greatest military leader the 
world has ever known, but eventually saved his country. 

Schuyler was a consummate practical-strategist, aiid lie saved 
the Colonies, just as de la Lippe saved Portugal in lTf)0. Tlie 
latter with feM- and poor troops could not face the Spaniards, 
iiuperior in discipline, preparation and numbers, but lie worried 
them outj and impeded them until he was ready to strike, and 
then he struck, and they were compelled to c\acuate Portugfd. 
The same was exactly the case with Schuyler. He knew that 
J^urgoyne could not advance without provisions. Accordingly he 
stripped tlic country before him of everything whicli could uoui'- 
ish his army, and he determined that he shoidd carry as little with 
him as possible, aud that little amid extreme difficulties sucli as 
ncN'er had entered into his calculations. 

A few years ago a beautiful picture was exhibited in the 
National Academy of Design, representing Mrs. General Schuy- 
ler setting fir ^ to her husband's golden fields of ripened grain. 
Thus by the destruction of his own crops, he set an example 
which thenceforward no one could refuse to follow. Thus when 
the cereals were reduced to ashes, aud the live stock driven off, 
Burgoyne, as he sadly remarked, had to look l)ack even across the 
sea to Irelaild for the daily nourishment of his soldiers. The 
food thus brought in shi])s, river-ci'aft, aud wheel-carriages, after 
a transit of nearly four thousand miles, was effectually stopped 
and neutralized by the barrierof desolation pre})ared by Schuyler. 
Provisions were already short by the 9th, loth July, l)efore the 
British got twelve miles from their water-base. 

Take a contemporaneous map of this portion of the State of 
New York, and the case will become apparent at a glance. 
Having reiulered land carriage almost im})ractical)le Mith Ids 
slashini'-s and destruction of the bridji'es, and water-transport 
almost e(pudly inn)Ossible by efforts of engineering labor, it is not 
surprising that Burgoyne, already, on tiie Tth of July, and at 
Skenesborough, was appalled by the difficulties before him. He 
was so ])erplexed at one time, that he tliouglit of going l)uck and 



19 

taking- the route of Lake George, originally suggested by his 
king. The most inimical critic will admit that Schuyler had done 
well, considering the original force at his disposition. 

Moreover, the English othcers admit that the Americans were 
indefatigable in securing thenivselves by entrenclnnents, and as a 
rule added an abatis to their field-works. This shows that they 
had some one at their head who knew as nnich in the beginning 
as our best generals and officers came to learn by experience of 
the hardest kind, after a long series of the bloodiest lessons. 

It is now universally conceded, tliat New England prejudice, 
violence, enmity and even baser passions occasioned tlie removal 
of Schuyler. This general , was always unpopular with the New 
Englanders. He had represented his native state in its collision 
with the " Green Mountain Boys," in the controversy concerning 
the " New Hampshire Grants." He had with indomitable will, 
maintained the rights of New York, and, to use a popular ex- 
pression, the New Englanders were "down on him" for it. 

In this connection as significant, let us examine into the com- 
]iosition of the forces under his command. 

On the 2Tth July, he had twenty-seven hundred Continental 
troops. 

Connecticut, at this time, was represented by one field officer, 
even conunissioned officers, six warrant officers, one drummer, 
six sick, three rank and file, the rest deserted. Fourteen field, 
line and warrant officers to three effective privates ! 

From Berkshire County, Massaclnisetts, about two hundred 
were with their colors, and in Colonel Moseby's regiment, luiiling 
from Hampshire County, ten or twelve were left. 

That is to say. New England, at this date, was repi-esented by 
two hundred and thirty-four men. 

New York had a thousand and fifty on the Hudson, besides 
tliose who were defending Fort StanAvix, and the eiglit hundred 
under Harkheimer, of whom about one-half perislied in l)attle 
within the next ten days. 

Out upon the pretentiousness of New England. They have 
compiled our school-books, and they have written our histories. 
No wonder that Fletcher of Saltoun said, "I care not who makes 
the laws, if I can only make the ballads of a people." 

There never was a New England writer just to the State of New 
York, from the first one who took up a pen, down to the eloquent 
historian who wound up l)y finding a new charge against New 
York's grciit son, that he was deficient in personal intrepidity. 



20 

Schuyler settled the question at the time by a single sentence: 
" The scoundrels that doubt my personal fortitude, dare not put it 
to the trial." 

Such meanness is sickening, but it is excusable, perhaps, in 
this case, since the same charge has been brought against Frederic 
the Great, against Napoleon, against Greene — in fact, against the 
majority of the best generals, who have failed to fulfil the absurd 
expectations of utter ignoran(;e. The Earl of Cardigan, after 
leading the Bal^iclava charge, was taunted with timidity by a 
London cockney, because he started ati the explosion of a beer- 
bottle in a railway station. 

With indignation spurring on a New Yorker and a Knicker- 
l)ocker to vindicate the most injured man of the Revolution, it is 
very difficult to put a curb upon the production of testimony. 

It was actually the 1 9th September before Burgoyne occupied 
his most southerly head-quarters. Freeman's House, distant from 
Albany al)out twenty-five miles in an air-line. Seventy-five days 
had elapsed from his victorious occupation of Ticonderoga before 
he stood upon the ground on wliich his fate was to be decided. 
The farthest that Schuyler's troops withdrew, was to "Half- 
Moon," so named after the discoverer, Henry Hudson's ship, at 
the junction of the Mohawk and the Hudson rivers. His head- 
quarters were, as yet, at Stillwater, in advance of his army. 
The^ice he directed all the movements which eventuated in 
success ; tlience it was that he nuide the effectual appeal to Stark 
to sacrifice his wounded pride and outraged feelings for the sal- 
vation of the country ; thence it was that he despatclied Arnold 
to the relief of Fort Stanwix; and there it was when Burgoyne, 
with his right arm amputated on the Oriskany, and his left on the 
Walloomscoick, was absolutely l^leeding to deatli, and ready to 
die of exhaustion, that he turned over the command to Gates. 

How few Americans are aware that in answer to liis appeal 
to Stark, the latter had replied that "he would take no orders 
from any officer in the Northern Department, saving your honor," 
i.e., Scluiyler. 

The key to the grand ultimate American success at Saratoga 
liad l>een acquired on tlie banks of the Oriskany, on the 6th 
August, in the sanu^ way that the fate of Mexico was actually 
determined in tlie wild pass of Bnena Vista by Taylor, although 
it i-eijuircd a series of victories t(» enable the main army un<ler 
S( ott t(» enter the capital of tlic Aztec Empire. In battles be- 
tween nations and races, as in combats between individuals, it is 



21 

hot always the last blow, several or even inaiiy of tlie last bloW8, 
that decide the question. Otherwise we shonkl never liave liad 
tlie proverb of " The iirst blow is lialf the battle." This was 
undoubtedly the case at Fontenoy, wliere tlie initiative volley of 
the English guards .did such execution, as to actually stun or 
paralyze the French infantry's capability of resistance. Or rather 
to present the case in a simple manner, which will make it clear 
without reflection, a thrust or shot, by wounding a large blood- 
vessel, may determine a conflict, althougli the wounded party 
should be absolutely ignorant of the injury he lias suffered, and 
continues, after its receipt, to flght on long and bravely. Again, 
prestige is poioer, and the morale of the Mexican army was com- 
pletely shattered at Buena Vista, and thus, with the prestige of 
the Aztec generals and of their old troops, the hope of ultimate 
success may almost be said to have abandoned their camp and 
tlieir standard. 

Considering the facts and results, the victory of Sai-atoga is a 
misnomer, and applied to it, the simile of a wounded blood- 
vessel is most appropriate. The destruction of Burgoyne was the 
result of a succession of severe wounds, not one of which can be 
attributed with justice to the science or sagacity, the power or 
patriotism of Gates. The deadly blows were inflicted by Schuy- 
ler. One of his weapons was Karkheimer or Herckiieimer at 
Oriskany ; the other, Stark, at Bennington. As Oriskany is 
flrst in order of time, there is much to justify, according to Mr. 
Creasy's method of deciding, tlie opinion that it was the turning- 
point of the campaign, and of the utter faihu*e of the British at 
the North. 

For instance, the alfair of Oriskany took place August Gtli, 
that of Bennington August 16fh. The flrst ocicurred on the ex- 
treme riglit wing, by whicli Burgoyne maintained his connection 
with Upper Canada. The second was on the extreme left of the 
British line of operations, which were, so to speak, " in air." The 
first battle of Stillwater was fouglit Sept. 19 ; tlie second at the 
same place, Oct. 7th, in the centre. The last skirmish was the 
lOtli. Every one of these last three were checks, rather than 
triumphs. Yet, nevertheless, the four together, of which the flrst 
two constituted the points on which the campaign turned, certain- 
ly the mere turning point, occasioned the surrender at Saratoga 
on the 17th of October. Logistics had more to do with the 
accomplishment .of this important result than 2'actics, or even 
perliaps than Strategy. What is moreTTlie hardest logistic 



22 

blows (if we may presume to use a nomi as an adjective) were 
devised and delivered bv Schuyler, long before Gates assumed the 
command, aud were executed anywliere but upon the field where 
tlie io-noraut masses inifiiiiuo tliat the boastino- Ano-lo-Amcrican 
gatliered liis laurels. 

One incident remains to l)e related which has always appeared 
to tlie speaker as the tinest exemplification of Schuyler's self- 
relian(te, amid such distressing difficulties, moral and pliysical, as 
surrounded liim. It has been related in different ways, but you 
shall hear it as it was first represented many years ago to tlie 
individual who addresses you. 

Scl\uyler was well aware of tlie importance of Fort Stanwix, 
and although apparently lie could not spare a single man, lie des- 
patched from eight hundred to one thousand men to save it, if 
still it could be saved ; to redeem it, if it had already been lost. 
Already calumniated as a n traitor, because he (?ould be truly 
brave, and save his country at the risk of his own individual repu- 
tation, his resolution to detach Arnold from an army already too 
t'cel)le to face Burgoyne in the field, raised a new storm of indig- 
nation against a ])atriot as true as Washington ; as a general, 
second to noiui who wore the l>lue and buff. 

The niglit before Learned or Arnold started, this glorious 
type of an American officer and gentleman was heard pacing to 
and fro in his room, with feelings lacerated and excited by the 
im])utation of tre:ison, for what he knew was a master stroke of 
military policy. 

" I will do it "" I He was heard to exclaim, more than once, 
with tlie strongest affirmation of our Saxon vernacular. " Let 
them call me traitor if they will." Again with the most empha- 
tic oath, he added, "Arnold shall- go" I 

Arnold marched ; and on receiving the news of his approach, 
St. Leger broke up the siege of Fort Stanwix, abandoned his 
artillery and stores and fled. 

" Thus was Bui'govne's right ai-ni withered (or lopped off at 
Fort Stanwix), and the left, which he had stretched (nearly) as 
far as Bennington, was arrested (or amputated, on the Iloosick, 
l)y our old friend, Stark, of F)nnker Hill memory, win* had been 
roused by the calls of General Schuyler." 

Bennington was fought and won on the 10th August, three 
days before Gates even made his appearance. He was just in 
time however to receive tlie report of the victory and transmit it 
to Congress and the ])eople, fyv^y his signatui-e as if it was a glory 
which should be credited to him. 



23 

Arnold, Schuyler's cliosen licnitoiumt, started to relieve Fort 
Stanwix on tlie i;3tli of Angust, but a portion of the same 
brigade, Learued's, from wliich liis living column liad been 
formed by volunteering, had already been despat(;lied l)y Schuy- 
ler in that direction. The mere news of liis approach caused St. 
Leger to bi-eak up tlie siege, and abandoning artillery and sup- 
plies, retreat precipitately. Arnold's siari was six days before tlie 
arrival of Gates. 

Furtliermore, let us not forget that St. Leger and Sir John 
Johnson had already experienced a stunning sliock at the hands 
of llarkheimer, on the Oriskany, on the fitli of August, thirteen 
days before Gates even showed himself. Gates M^as at Stillwatei", 
within two to four miles of tlie invaders of his adopted country, 
wliich entrusted its most important command to him, on tlie 19th 
of August. These dates are repeated for emphasis. 

Gates found ready to his liand an army, <'Ocks in their own 
barn-yard, of tlirice the effective strength of tlie enemy. Never- 
tlieless, exactly a month elapsed before tliere was any battle, and 
when it did occur the aggressive was on tlie part of tlie British. 
" It is admitted that Gates did not leave his camp during the 
contest; and the special adjutant referred to, (says Lossing in his 
"Field Book of the Revolution,"'' ii., 44), asserted boldly, that 
intoxication was the chief cause.'' As this is one of the stereotyped 
(diarges against generals, it is not worth while to dwell upon it ; 
but it appears to be conceded, that not only Burgwne hinaself, but 
three of his Major-generals were prominently upon the battle 
ground, and under the most spiteful Hre, v.'hereas on the American 
side not one — not even a Brigadier, appeared there until near its 
close. 

In the next battle, Stillwater, Tth October, Gates, with 
at least two if not three Americans to one Britisher, did not 
again show himself to the troops ; neither did Ids second in com- 
mand, Lincoln. The chief glory of this day belongs to Arnold, 
who had no legitimate right to be there, and a goodly share to 
Morgan. The formei' w;is the realizing spirit of the fighting, and 
Morgan did his duty most effectually. Beth these were children 
of tlie oi'iginal, bona tide, New ISetherland domain. 

It was in conse(jucnce of Morgan's particular personal orders 
that Fraser, Burgoyne's best lieutenant, was picked oft' and 
mortally wounded; and there is very little doubt that Fraser's 
fall was the principal cause of the American victory. What is 
more, as a farther proof of the tremeiulous~effect of the precision 



of the American Bliai'p-shooters' tire, wat^ tlie fatal wounding of 
Sir Francis Clarke, Bnrgoyne'.s lirst or cliief aide-de-camp, at the 
very moment when he was conveying a most important order to 
Lieutenant Colonel Kingston, in regard to tlie disposition of the 
Britisli artilleiy. 

Wliat was Gates doing at the crisis of this battle — the con- 
quering Gates — wliose fame, based on ISclm^der's sacrilices, 
watchings aiid labors, was to till the wliole landi To avoid a 
charge of misrepresentation the speaker will quote in reply from 
the noted historian Lossing, wlio introduces this statement not 
only into liis "Field Book of the lievolution," but repeats it in liis 
biograpJiy of Schuyler. (11, 869). 

" AVliile Arnold was wielding the fierce sickle of war without, 
and reaping golden sheaves for Gates' garner, as Schuyler had 
intimated that he was likely to do, the commander (according t(j 
Wilkinson) was within his camp, more intent upon discussing the 
merits of the struggle with Sir Francis Clarke (Burgoyne's aide- 
de-camp, who had been wounded and taken a prisoner, and was 
lying upon Gates' bed at headquarters), than upon winning a 
battle which was all-important to the ultimate triumpli of those 
principles for which he professed so warm an iittachment. When 
Wilkinson came to hiui from tlie battle-field for orders, he found 
Gates very angry because Sir Francis would not allow tlie force 
of his argument. He left the room, and calling his aide after him, 
aske<l, as they went out: ' Did you ever hear so impudent a son 

of a ? ' Poor Sir Francis died that night upon the bed of 

his coarse and vulgar antagonist." 

The last lighting or skiiinishing which occurred on the 9tli, 
10th Oct., was lighted up by the flames of Schuyler's devastated 
mansion; barns, mills, store houses, granaries, and other build- 
ings on the south shores of the Fishkill, such as to-day would 
cost $150,000. A few weeks previous, Mrs. Schuyler had burned 
her crops to prevent them from proliting the enemy, and now, al- 
most the last act of the invader was to lay her happy home in ashes. 

Burii'ovne had now become convinced that his army could no 
longer tight, maintain itself, retreat in a body, or even escape in 
detachments. The Americans would not hazard an engagement, 
although they w^ere from ten to fifteen thousand strong in effec- 
tives, and the British had only three thousand tive hundred tight- 
ino- men left. Every portion of Burgoyne's position could be 
"searched out," not only with artillery, hut Mith small arms, 
especially rifles. What is more, every American who had even 



25 

a fowling-piece, had become as valuable as a regular soldier. If 
he could not stand up like a professional in line of battle, and 
augment a volley, or cross bayonets, he could bushwhack like a 
frontiersman or an Indian. From behind a tree, a practised 
stripling might pick off the bravest soldier or the most capable 
officer, either, a much larger target than the partridge or squirrel 
he was accustomed to bring down with a single Ijall. These were 
the tactics which at Kings Mountain, 7Hi Oct., 1780, the liercest 
southern conflict of the whole seven years, overwhelmed the 
most capable and intrepid partisan in the royal service. This 
decisive engagement is remarkable as the first in history in which 
breech-loading rifles, with elevating sights, were used as weapons 
for troops " of the line" and in line. The Americans could not 
stand the British bayonet, which scattered them like sheep, but 
the victors in the charge were eventually shot down like wild 
beasts in a battu. If there is an accursed trade in the whole 
immense circle of violence, that gives "a warrant to break into 
the bloody house of life," to which man readily adapts himself, it 
is that of a sharpshooter. Each successful shot is a deliberate 
murder. 

If Gates had possessed any of the foresight and insight of a 
general, he could have compelled Burgoyne's surrendei* at discre- 
tion. He had done nothing to reduce him to the necessity, and 
he did nothing to profit by the necessity to which he had been re- 
duced by Schuyler. 

When Schuyler, by legal inheritance, became possessed of a 
vast fortune for the time, he shared it with his brothers and 
sisters. Out of his own purse he relieved the necessities of his 
country. In this he had very few imitators. Only one at this 
particular juncture — Langdon of New Hampshire. Too many 
of the patriots were rather intent on filling their pockets. As a 
recompense for his own patriotism, an Englishman was allowed 
to steal liis birthright and Nev Englandei-s enabled him to do so. 

Schuyler's letters, w^hen he knew that he was to be superced- 
ed, read almost like the telegrams of Thomas when threatened 
with supercedure before Nashville. 

Burgoyne surrendered! 

France acknoMdedged American Independence, sent us troops, 
and wdiat was far more important, money and supplies of all 
kinds. Without France, freedom would not have been achieved 
even in six more years, if at all. Little gratitude however, is due 
to France since the Colonies were simpIyThe instruments of her 



26 

vengeance upon England. Thus the capitulation oi Saratoga was 
the pass-key to American victory. 

Schuyler forged and fitted the key ; inserted it in the lock ; 
and Gates was allowed to turn it ; Schuyler, to the last, forgetful 
of self, and only mindful of his country, assisting Gates to open 
the door. 

A year afterwards, Congress and a court-martial exonerated 
Schuyler from all blame, and within three years ATE'S sleepless 
sleuth-hounds tore Gates down from his place of pride, and 
avenged Schuyler. Unfortunately Ate can only punish, it is not 
her prerogative to reward 

The speaker's duty to- his native State and to his Knicker- 
bocker blood is discharged, but«iNew i'ork, untrue to herself in 
tlie present as in the past — as untrue to-day as in 1777 — has set 
up no monument, either to Harkheimer, mortally wounded in 
body at Oriskany ; or to Schuyler, crucified in spirit at Saratoga. 

Why? Is it necessary for the speaker to proclaim it? Be- 
cause Schuyler was not an intriguer nor a politician, a speculator 
nor a peculator, but a Christian gentleman and a true soldier. 

Schuyler in arms never served again. He performed his 
duty to the letter to the United States and to New York. He 
inaugurated the system M'hich has made this the " Empire State," 
and despite the fiercest life-long tortures of disease he did all that 
any man could do to serve his fellow citizens to the very last. He 
died full of suffering, affiiction, years, and honors conceded too 
late, on the 18th of !Novcml)er, 1804, realizing " Perfection is the 
greatest fault the envious man can discover — the first he cannot 
roach, the last he cannot injure." 

" Grave preccitts fleeting notions ni.iy impart, 
But bright exainj)le best instnu-ts the heart; 
Then look on Fabius, let his conduct show, 
From active life wliat various blessings flow. 
In him a just ambition stands confessed; 
It warms, but not inflames his equal breast. 
See him in senates act the patnot's part, 
Truth on his lips, the public at his heart, 
There neither fears can awe, nor hopes control 
The honest purpose of his steadj' soul. 
No mean attachments e'er seduced his tongue 
To gild the cause his heart suspected wrong ; 
But, deaf to envy, faction, spleen, his voice 
Joins here or there, as reason guides his choice. 
To one great ])oiut his faithful labors tend, 
And all his toil in ' Freedom's' interest end." 



- — L 



li 



MAJOR GENERAL 

Philip Schuyler, 



BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN 



IN THE SUMMER OF 



1777, 



What build a Nation's bulwarks high and its foundations form; 
What make it mighty to defy the foes that round it swarm ; 
Not Gold but only Men can make a People great and strong ; 
Men, who for Truth and Honor's sake, stand fast and suffer long; 
Brave men who watch while others sleep, who fight while others fly ; 
They plant a nation's pillars deep and lift them to the sky. 



THE 



A.]Sr]SrUiVL i^DDRESS 



DELIVERED 



TUESDAY EVENING, 2d JANUARY, 1877, 

BEFORE THE 

New York Historical Society, 

BY 

(lEN) JOHN WATTS DE PEYSTER. 



NEW YORK: 
Holt Brothers, Printers, 151 William' 

1877. 





